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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MELVIN

GREENH~LGH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
ELAINE G. GREEN,
administratrix of the estate of
GERALD F. GREEN,
deceased,

Case No.
10169

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF DEFEN'DANiT-RESPONDEN'T
STATEMENT OF THE N~TURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries brought
by an occupant of an automobile against the administratrix of the estate of the deceased driver
al'ising out of the roll-over of the vehicle.
DISPOSITION IN DOWER COURT
The lower court granted the administratrix of
the estate of the deceased driver a summary judgment of "No Cause df Action."
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL
Defendant wants the summary judgment affirmed.
1
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STATE'MEN'T OF FACTS
The facts most favorable to the Plaintiff show
that on or about October 18, 1963, the Plaintiff,
Joseph 'Lockyer, a third person, and the deceased
driver, Gerald F. Green were involved in an acci-.
dent on U.S. Highway 91 approximately five miles
south of Cove Fort, Utah whrle on a deer hunting
trip. (Dep. 6-7).
The deceased, Gerald F. ~Green was the salesmanager for the Peerless Barber and Beauty 'Supply,
and Joseph Lockyer and the plaintiff were salesme:q
for the same Company. This was the last of a number of hunting and fishing trips that they had taken
for mutual pleasure and enjoyment. (R. 21).
At the time o'f the accident, they were riding
in a Dodge Pickup ·Truck owned by the deceased,
Gerald F. Green. Mr. Lockyer was sitting in the
middle and Mr. Greenhalgh, the plaintiff, was sitting on the right side and allegedly Mr. Green was.
driving. (R. 21).
In his deposition, Mr. Greenhalgh stated the
expenses of the trip were to he sp'li t three ways,
with each member sharing and paying an equal
part of the expense. An occupants of the car at the
time of the acci'dent were residents of Salt Lake
City and on the night before the trip started they
met at the home of Mr. Green and then left to make
purchases for supplies for the trip. At the AG
Market on east 33rd south near the Motor-Vu
Theatre some food was purchased. The plaintiff
2
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~tated

that Mr. Green purchased two- fifths of
vodka, two - fifths of bourbon and they purchased
four cases of beer at the AG store. Further, the
plaintiff said Mr. Green filled the Dodge Pickup
truck with gas in Salt Lake City, Utah and that no
other gas was obtained until Holden, Utah where
the plaintiff stated he paid for the purchase of some
gas. (Dep. 16-17).
No claim is made that Mr. Green was guilty
of willful or wanton misconduct or that he was
intoxicated, but it is interesting to note that a11
bottles of bourbon and vodka were opened at the
time of the accident, and that the occupants of the
automobile were drinking beer or had just finished
drinking beer at the time of the accident. (Dep.
19-20).

Two years before this acc:ldent occurred, the
plaintiff and Mr. Green had gone on another hunting trip for deer and had shared expenses equally.
(Dep. 21.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AS A MATTER OF 'LAW THE PLAINTJIFF WAS
A GUEST IN THE DECEDENTS AUTOMOBILE AT
THE TIME OF THE AOCIDEN'T.

Section 41-9-12 Utah Code Annotated 1953, defines a guest in an automobile as follows:
"GUEST DEFINED - For the purpose of
this section the term ''guest" is hereby defined as being a person who accepts a ride
in any vehicle without giving compensation
therefor."
3
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Further, with respect to the duty owed to a
guest, Section 41-9-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953
provides:
"Responsibility of owner or driver of a vehicle to guest - Any person who as a guest
accepts a ride in any vehicle, moving upon
any of the public highways of the state of
Utah, and while so riding as such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall have no
right of recovery ,against the owner or driver
such vehicle. In the event that such person
whi'le so riding as such guest, is killed, or
dies as a result of injury sustained while so
riding as such guest, then neither the estate
nor the legal representative or heirs of such
guest shall have any right of recovery against
the driver or owner of said vehicle by reason
of the death of said guest. If such person
so rides as a guest be a minor and sustain
an injury or be killed or die as a result of
injury sustained while so riding as such guest,
then neither the parents nor guardians nor
the estate nor legal representatives or heirs
of such minor shall have any right of recovery
against the driver or owner or person responsible for the operation of said vehicle for injury sustained or as a result of the death of
such minor. Nothing in this section shall be
construed as relieving the owner or driver or
person responsible for the operation of a vehicle from liability for injury to or death of
such guest proximately resulting from the intoxication or willful misconduct of such owner, or driver or person responsible for the
operation of su~h vehicle; provided, that in
any action for death or for injury or damage
4
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to person or properly by or on behalf of a
guest or the estate, heirs or legal representatives df such guest, the burden shall be upon
plain tiff to establish that such intoxication
or willful misconduct was the proximate cause
of such dea:th or injury or damage".
'The plaintiff contends because of the agreement to share expenses of the trip that he was not
a guest in the deceased's automobile at the time of
the accident. If the plain ti'ff is a guest, he is barred
from recovery, be'cause neither willful misconduct
nor intoxication a:re alleged in the complaint.
In Jensen vs. Mower (19 5'6) 4 U. 2d 336,294,
P.2d, 683, this court said that if a driver of an automobile extended the courtesy of the ri'de to a friend
without more or takes on a hiker overtaken on a
highway, the status of "guest" would within the
n1eaning of the automobile guest statute, is not replaced by that of passenger merely because gasoline
is purchased, meals are paid for, or cash is given
by the rider to assist the driver in meeting the expenses of the trip. In Jensen vs. Mower, supra, our
court said our guest statute is substantially the same
as the California statute which reads:
"No person who as a guest accepts a ride in
any vehicle upon a highway without giving
compensation for such ride* * *has any right
of action for the civil damages against the
driver of such vehicle * * * unless the Plaintiff in any such action, establishes that such
injury or death proximately resulte'd in intoxication or willful misconduct of said
driver." (Emphasis added)
1
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In the leading case of Whitmore vs. French,
('1951) 37 Cal. 2d 744, 235 P .'2d 3, the California
Supreme Court used this 'language:
"The designations 'passenger" and 'guest'
have been adopted for the purpose of distinguishing a person who has given compensation
within the meaning of section 403 of the Vehicle Code from one carried gratuitously.
Gruzie vs. Sanders, ·2'37, '2'41, 143 Pacific 2nd
704. A person who accepts a ride does not
cause to be guest and become a passenger
merely by extending ·customary courtesies of
the road, such as paying bridge or ferry tolls
(see Rest., Torts, Section 490, a), and it has
been held that the sharing of expenses does
not destroy the host and guest relationship if
nothing more is involved than the exchange of
social amenities and reciprocal hospitality.
McCann vs. Hoffman, 9 Cal '2nd, 279, 70 Paci'fic '2nd 909. Where however, the driver receives a tangible benefit, monetary or otherwise, which is a motivating influence for
furnishing the transportaJtion, the rider is a
passenger and the driver is liwb1e for ordinary
negligence. (Citing cases.)"
1

In Harper and James, Law of Torts, Volume
II, Section 16.'15, Page 95'8, it is stated:
"* * * All agree that the occupant is a guest
where he obtains the benefits of the ride if
his presence confers none upon the host except
the satisfaction of hospitality and social relationships. On the other side, the passenger
who pays money as a fare, and not by way of
reciprocating hospitality in clearly not a
guest.''
6
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In California in McCann vs. Hoffman (19'37)
9 Cal. 2d 279, 70 P. 2d 909, the California Supren1e
court, sitting in bank, sustained a judgment of nonsuit, for two couples who went on a family automobile trip to an apparent tacit and natural understanding that such expenses would be equally shared
and when an accident arose at an intersection on
the trip.
In McCann vs. Hoffman, supra, the California
Court said:
"The great weight df authority is to the effect
that the sharing of the cost of gasoline and
oil consumed on a trip when that trip is taken
for pleasure or social purposes, it is nothing
more than the exchange of social amenities
and does not transform into a passenger one
who without such exchange would be a guest,
and consequently is not payment for the transportation or compensation within the meaning
of statute. It is obvious that if a different result obtained under any construction of statute, its purposes would be defeated and its
effect annulled. The relationships which will
give ride to the statute, of a passenger must
confer a benefit of tangible nature and are
limited''.
In another California case, Kroiss vs. Butler,
(1954) 129 C. A. 2d 550, 277 P. 2d 873, where
the plaintiff tried to hag a golden goose subsequent
to an accident which occurred on a quail hunting e~i
pedition and where the plaintiff claimed he was a
passenger for hire because he has superior knowledge of terrain offering seclusion, cover and feed
1
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for quail, and superior ability to call quail and to
recognize signs of quail, and where the driver and
appellant were friendly and had hunted together
previously, and where each party took his own gun
and shells, where the driver selected the place to
hunt and where there was no discussion regarding
their relative abilities, the court held evidence not
sufficient to support a verdict for the appellant.
In Kansas, in Bedenbender vs. Watts, (1'955)
177 Kan. 531, 280 P. 2d 630, where a lawsuit arose
subsequent to a pheasant hunting trip, the court declared where the parties of the pheasant hunt had
agreed to share expenses and where the trip was for
social and mutua'! pleasure and where there was an
arrangement to share expenses for gasoline, oil and
meals, that the payment for those did not constitute
payment for transportation within the meaning of
the guest statute and that the parties enjoyed the
relationship of host and guest and the court affirmed
a Judgment of Dismissal on demurrer to the complaint.
In South Dakota in Schlim vs. Gau ( 1963)
____ S. D. ____ , 125 N.W. '2d 174 where four friends
were on an antelope hunting trip under an arrangement whereby they were to share the automobile
expenses an'd where an accident occurred aft~r the
automobile owner permitted another member of the
hunting group to drive it, and where the trial judge
directed a verdict for the defendant driver, the :appellant court held that the tria!l judge correctly directed the verdict for the defendant driver as the
8
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arrangement to share expenses for gasoline did not
change the plaintiffs' status from that of guest to
passenger.
In Nevada, in Kuser vs. Barengo (1953) 70
Nev. 66, '254 P. 2d '245, where the p'laintiff asked
for a ride to a convention in Las Vegas from Reno,
where the parties lived, and where permission to
take the trip was taken with the understanding that
each party would pay ~a portion of the expense for
the gasoline and auto, the court held as a matter of
law, the plaintiff was a guest and coul'd not recover.
In Ansback vs. Greenberg, (1953) 2'56 S.W.
2d 1, the Kentucky 'Court, where the plaintiff and
defendant went to Florida to visit the daughter of
the plaintiff, and where the trip was made in the
defendant's automobile, and driver fell as~eep, and
where it was agreed the plain tiff would pay onehalf of the cost of the gas and oil, and court held
the plaintifs were '·'guests" of the defendant and
not "paying passengers," an'd that within the meaning of the Georgia guest law, the plaintiff could not
recover for accidental injuries unless such acts were
caused hy gross negligence, which the facts did not
show.
In Idaho in Riggs vs. Rogers ( 1'95'3) Idaho 3'7
743, 264 P. 2d 698, the Idaho court said mere
paying for gas and oil or sharing payment therefore
of itself is not sufficient to establish a passenger
status where the occupant paid nominal cost to help
defray the expenses of the transportation.
9
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In Colorado, in Mears vs. Kovacic ( 1963) ___ _
Colo. ____ , 38'1 P. '2d 991, the Colorado Supreme Court,
sitting en bane, held where the automobile occupant
had agreed to pay the driver, a close personal friend,
for such incidental expenses as gasoline, oil, food
and lodging, but did not contemplate paying driver
for depreciation of automobile or otherwise compensating the driver 1and the plaintiff occupant was a
guest within the guest statute, and that as a matter
of law sustained the trial court's Judgment of Dismissal.
In argument it is submitted this trip was motivated or induced by the members who wished to
satisfy the social pieasure of a hunting and camping trip, and that the lower court, recognizing the
ordinary facts of life, properly resolved the question
in favor of the defendant administratrix.
Manifestly, these men didn't drive to southern
Utah merely to share in the expenses of the trip
equally three ways. All substantial evidence clearly
indicates the sharing of expenses was merely an act
of social reciprocation and that it was not compensation for the ride.
In Utah in Smith vs. Franklin, (196'2) 14 U. 2d
16,'376 P. '2d, 541, the question :arose as to what constituted compensation sufficient to change what
normally would be a "guest" to a "pass'enger" for
hire. 'This quote said:
"It must be conceded that where it is shown
that the driver is basically a social guest,
10
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neither the giving of just any compensation,
which might be some inconsequential amount
of money or other consideration of value, or
even the sharing of expenses, merely for social reciprocation for the ride, would change
the relationship of that of "passenger" to
that of "passenger for hire." The phrase compensation therefore, as used in the statute
mean compensation for the ride. Therefore,
it would have to be sufficient money (or other
thing of value) that it reasonably could be
supposed that the party so regarded it. But
whether there is profit in the tram.saction is
obviously not the determining factor. Where
payment for the ride is the main inducement
for it, the fact that there may also exist some
social incentive which makes giving the ride
enjoyable or desirab'le for the driver could
not change his character to that of host 1am.d
guest.''
Further, in Smith vs. Franklin, supra, it is
interesting to note that the rider paid $2.00 for gas,
a sum which the driver deemed sufficient to purchase the gas for the trip, and thereafter the question was submitted to the jury ~as to whether or
not plaintiff was a passenger for hire, and the jury
found the plaintiff was not, and thereafter on appeal, two dissenting, justices of this court indicated
that as a matter of law the tri1al court should have
held the giving of the $2.00 fare vvas not compensation.
In summary, it is submitted this trip was motivated by the mutual desire of the members to do
some hunting and engage in a little social drinking.
11
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The $6.45 the plaintiff paid for a tank of gas at
Holden, Utah was merely an act of social reciprocation. Mr. Green furnished the car and purchased all
gas ~rut the start of the tri!p. The plaintiff's purchase
of the $6.45 of gas was an exchange of one social
amenity for another. After all, he stated they were
to share the expenses equally three ways from
the supplies taken, it's clearly evident they took
the trip to hunt deer and do a little drinking and
not merely for the purpose of sharing expenses, or
-compensating Mr. Green.
POINT II.
THERE rS NO COM PETENT EVIDENCE THE
RlDE WAS INDUGE!D BY OFFE'R OF COMPENSATION.
1

The respondent claims as a matter of l~a,w no
compensation was given and that the plaintiff was
a· guest in the decedent's automobile at the time of
the ra;ccident. However, for the sake of argument this
point is discussed as at the pre-trial hearing where
the Motion for Summary Judgment was granted,
Mr. Dihb'lee said he could prove that the decedent
was induced to take his car by an offer for compensation.
'The respondent contends proof of the rider
being induced by an offer of compensation is barred.
What induced Mr. Green to drive his car is particularly within his own knowledge. Section 78-11-12
Utah Code Annotated provides:
"Injury to person or death -

No abatement

12

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of cause of action upon death of wrongdoerAction against personal representative of
tvrongdoer- Evidence required- Causes of
action arising out of physical injury to the
person or death caused by the wrongful act or
negligence of another, shall not abate upon the
death of the wrongdoer, and the injured person or the personal representatives or heirs of
one meeting death, as above stated, shall have
a cause of action against the personal representatives of the wrongdoer; provided, however, that the injured person or the personal
represenbatives or heirs of one meeting death
shall not recover judgment except upon some
campetent satisfactory evidence other than
the testimony of said injured person." (EMPHASIS ADDED)
Further, paragraph 3 of Section 78-24-2, Utah
Code Annotated 19'53, provides that the following
person cannot be witnesses :
('3) "A party towny civil action, suit or proceeding, and any person ,directly interested in
the event thereof, and any person from,
through on under whom such party or interested person derived his interest or title or
any part thereof, when the adverse party in
such action, suit or proceeding cl·aims or opposes, sues or defends, as guardian of an insane or incompetent person or as executor or
administrator, heir, legatee or devisee of any
deceased person, or as guardian, assignee or
grantee, directly or remotely or such heir,
legatee or devisee, as to any statement by, or
transaction with, such deceased, insane or incompetent person, or matter of fact whateve1'·,
which mttst have been equally within the
13
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knowledge of both the witness and such insane, incompetent or deceased person, unless
such witness is called to testify thereto by
such adverse party so claiming or opposing
suing or defending, in such action, suit or pro~
ceeding." (EMPHASIS ADDED)

It is equally within the know ledge of the decedent, Mr. Green, what was said at the time the
share-expense arrangement was made. However, it
would be peculiarly within the knowledge on1y of
Mr. Green what induced him to taili:e the plaintiff
along. Mr. Lockyer and the plainti'ff, the other parties of the share-expense agreement were persons
directly interested in the event and each are or
were clients of Mr. Dibblee. Any opinion they had
as to any matter of fact or a sta:tement by Mr. Green
would be barred by Section 78-24-2 which is commonly spoken of as the "dead man's act."
In Andreades vs. McMillan (19'53) C.T. of Civ.
App. of 'Tex., 256 S.W. 2d 4'77, where a personal injury action was brought 'against an administrator of
a deceased motorist whose vehicle collided with the
vehicle in which the p'laintiff was riding and where
it was held the trial court properly refused to allow
introduction of testimony of plaintiff as to the facts
and circumstances surrounding the collision the
court quoted from Holland vs. Nimitz 111 Tex,
4'19, '2'3·2 8. W. 2d 298, '299, 2'3'9 S. W. 2d 185, in
which the Supreme Court of Texas said.
'''The object of the statute was to prohibit the
interested heirs and legal representatives from
14
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testifying as to facts, or opinions based upon
observations, arising out of any transaction
with the decedent which the decedent could,
if living, contradict or explain. Death having
sealed the lips of one of the parties, the law
for reason founded upon public policy seals
the lips of the other."
The purpose of the dead man's statute is to
put the parties upon terms of equality in regard
to giving evidence of the transaction.
In Davis vs. Pearson (t941) 2'20 N.C. 163, 16
SE 2d 655, where ian action was brought against the
adn1inistrator of a deceased motorist :for injury sustained in an automobile accident it was held plaintiff's testimony concerning the events preceding
and subsequent to accident were inadmissable under
statute as concerning a personal transaction between
the plain tiff and the deceased.
In Burke vs. Peter, ('1951) 11'5 U 58 202 P 2d 543,
where an action was brought by an administratrix
of an estate to recover a promissory note found in
among the possessions o'f the deceased 1am.d signed
by the defendant as payor, this court held the trial
court did not err in refusing to allo\v the defendant
to testify concerning alleged lack of consideration
for execution of note, where such fact was equally
within the knowledge of the defendant and the deceased, and where administratrix did not testify
concerning that transaction but only testified about
a conversation purporting to referred to non-payment of the debt owed by defendant to the deceased.
15
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As a result of the enactment of Section 78-11-12,
Utah Code Annotated 19 53, no longer does death
of the wrongdoer aba;te an action against the
estate or personal representative of the wrongdoer.
However, the injured person may not recover judgment against the administratrix of the estate except
on competent satisfactory evidence other than the
testimony of s1ruid injured person and it is submitted
that the dead man's act bars the ·plaintiff and Mr.
Lockyer from offering testimony as to what induced
Mr. Green to take him on the trip.
1

CONCLUSION
Respondent submits the plaintiff's deposition
shows as a matter of law the pl'aintiff was a guest
and he did not give compensation for the ride. The
judgment of the lower court shou~d be affirmed.
Futher, it is noted that in the ease of Smith vs.
Franklin 14 U. 2d 6, 37!6 P 2d 5'41, the question of
whether or not the plaintiff was a guest as ia matter
of law was not before the court as it was not necessary to consider the question in the Smith vs. Franklin case inasmuch as the jury found the plaintiff
was a guest.
Respectfully submitted.
RAYMOND M. BE'R'RY
203 Executive Building
45'5 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for
Defendant-Respondent
16
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I hereby certify that on this ------------------------ day
of September, 19'64, I mailed two copies of the aforegoing Brief by United States mail, postage prepaid,
to Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black, Attorneys
at Law at the address shown on the cover of this
brief.
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